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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT -

PRIVI-

THE fuouE
CASE - The decisions of the United States Supreme Court in recent
years, interpreting the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,1
LEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE -

CIVIL LIBERTIES -

1 "All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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have manifested two striking changes in trend. The first is towards
less judicial restraint on governmental regulation of business; that is,
towards tolerance of diminished "business liberty." 2 The other is
towards greater judicial restraint on governmental interference with
individual liberty, commonly called civil liberty. 8 A recent case/ which
upheld freedom of speech and assembly and invalidated a city ordinance
requiring the obtaining of a permit as prerequisite to a public meeting,
not only illustrates the latter of these trends, but is unusual in that it
extends the application of the "privileges and immunities clause" as
a basis for the decision.
When the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment was framed
in 1866, its proponents stated in Congress that its purpose was to eQ;force against the states 5 the Bill of Rights coIJ,tained in the first eight
amendments, which had been held to'· apply ohly to the Federal Government.8 It is believed that this was the concensus of opinion in Congress
and in the country at large. 7 The various drafts of the section began
2 E.g., Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231
(1934) (mortgage moratorium upheld); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S.
Ct. 505 (1934) (state regulation of milk industry); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937) (state minimum wage law); National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615 (1937)
(Wagner Act upheld); Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U. S. 468, 57
S. Ct. 857 (1937) {state labor code upheld); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301
U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883 (1937) {Social Security).
8 It is interesting to consider how far these trends reflect changing mores. Cf.
Borchard, "The Supreme- Court and Private Rights," 47 YALE L. J. 1051 (1938).
¼ Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, (U.S. 1939) 59 S. Ct. 954,
modifying and affirming (C. C. A. 3d, 1939) 101 F. (2d) 774, which modified and
affirmed (D. C. N. J. 1938) 25 F. Supp. 127~ The lower courts held that the ordinance was arbitrarily, hence unconstitutionally, enforced. The Supreme Court held that
the ordinance itself was unconstitutional and void, because it permitted arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. The ordinance had been upheld in Thomas v. Casey, 121
N. J. L. 183, I A. (2d) 866 (1938). For discussion of the district court decision,
and of the merits of the case, see 37 M1cH. L. REV. 609 (1939); 52 HARV. L. REV.
320 (1938); 7"GE0. WASH. L. REV. 1026 (1939); 25 A.B.A.J. 7 (1939); and
Williams, "Civil Liberty in Jersey City," I NAT. LAWY. GUILD Q. 363 (1938).
An excellent comment on all phases of the case is found at 48 YALE L. J. 257 (1938),
which also discusses the basis for federal jurisdiction, under the Judicial Code, 28
U. S. C. (1934), § 41 (14), over causes of action defined by the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 8 U. S. C. (1934), § 43. See, on the general subject of the right of assembly,
47 YALE L. J. 404 (1938).
15 Bingham, in CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., I~t sess., part 2, pp. 1090 ff. (1866);
Howard, ibid., part 3, pp. 2765-2766.
8 Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. (32 U. S.) 243 (1833).
7 See Graham, "The 'Conspiracy Theory' of the Fourteenth Amendment;'
47 YALE L. J. 371 at 400 and 48 YALE L .. J. 171 (1938); Boudin, "Truth and
Fiction about the Fourteenth Am!'!ndment," 16 N. Y. UN1v. L. Q. REV. 19 at 70 ff.
(1938); FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 57, 80-97
(1908).
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by using the phraseology of the "equal protection" and "privileges and
immunities" clauses, while the "due process" clause was not added
until later.8 It appears that the privileges and immunities clause was
considered to be the most important part of the section. Its framer,
John Bingham of Ohio, stated that he took it from the privileges and
immunities clause of article 4, section two. 0 He believed that the latter
was intended to proclaim the "fundamental rights" of the citizen of a
state.10 This view of the privileges and immunities clause of article 4,
section two, is not the one which has prevailed,11 but it was current in
1866, and explains the inclusion of this clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment. Bingham's view thus was that the Constitution had
already proclaimed the rights of the citizen against state action, but
that there was no sanction to enforce the protection. This sanction
was to be supplied by section :five of the new amendment.12
This view of the new amendment was not adopted by the Supreme
Court. In 1873, in the Slaughterhouse Cases,18 the Court held without
much discussion that the due process and equal protection clauses did
not apply to a case of alleged state deprivation of the right to pursue a
common calling (by reason of a state-authorized monopoly). The privileges and immunities clause received a more extended discussion. It was
held to protect only those rights which are peculiar to citizenship of the
8 See Graham, "The Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment," 48
YALE L. J. 171 at 182 (1938); Boudin, "Truth and Fiction about the Fourteenth
Amendment," 16 N. Y. UNiv. L. Q. REV. 19 at 38 ff. (1938).
9
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st sess., part 2, pp. 1034-1035 (1866). That
clause is, "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States."
10
Boudin, "Truth and Fiction about the Fourteenth Amendment," 16 N. Y.
UNIV. L. Q. REV. 19 at 35 (1938). This view derives from a dictum of Cor.field v.
Coryell, (C. C. Pa. 1823) 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, No. 3,230, and
was held by Bingham as early as 1859. See CoNG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d sess., p. 984
(1859).
11
It is now held that this section protects the citizen only from discriminatory
denial of "fundamental rights," i.e., from denial to citizens of other states of those
rights which it grants to its own citizens. Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 168
(1869); Downham v. Alexandria, IO Wall. (77 U. S.) 173 (1870); Slaughterhouse
Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 at 77 (1873); Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239 at
256, 19 S. Ct. 165 (1898). But in 1866 the question had not been settled, although
the decided cases generally involved problems of discrimination. Cf. United States
v. Hall, (C. C. Ala. 18n) 26 Fed. Cas. 79 at 81, No. 15,282, overruled by the
Slaughterhouse Cases. See HoWELL, THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF STATE
CITIZENSHIP 18-21 (1918); McGovney, "Privileges or Immunities Clause-Fourteenth Amendment," 4 lowA L. Buu. 219 at 229 (1918).
12
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article."
18
16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 (1873).
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United States,14 that is, rights given to the citizen by the Constitution,
and by statutes and treaties made pursuant thereto.15 This result was
reached by saying that the framers must have meant something by
guaranteeing only the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States, rather than those of citizens of the states, since the two
kinds of citizenship had just been carefully distinguished in the preceding sentence of the section. As a matter of fact, the privileges and
immunities of each citizenship were considered synonymous by the
framers,16 and the sentence defining citizenship was not inserted until
the amendment went to the Senate, after having been passed by the
House.17 As the dissenting judges pointed out, this construction rendered the privileges and immunities clause of no e:ffect, since this kind
of rights was already protected by the supremacy clause.18
In the course of time, "fundamental rights" were protected against
state action, by invocation of the due process clause, a doctrine which
reached its culmination around the turn of the century.10 Thus the
result of the Slaughterhouse Cases was overturned. But the construction given to the privileges and immunities clause in that case remained
M There is an attempt to enumerate the privileges and immunities of citizenship
of the United States in the Slaughterhou~e Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 at 79 ff.

(1873).
111 The doctrine is stated in Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 at 382, 14 S. Ct.
570 (1894), as follows: "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States, protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, are privileges and immunities arising
C\ut of the nature and essential character of the Federal government, and granted or
secured by the Constitution ••••"
16
See notes 9 and IO above.
17
FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 83, 88-97 (1908).
18
Article 6, section 2. See also dissent of Justice Fields in Slaughterhouse Cases,
:i;6 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 at 96 (1873). Cf. McGovney, "Privileges or Immunities
Clause-Fourteenth Amendment," 4 lowA L. BULL. 219 (1918). Apparently the
Court did not consider the language of the amendment sufficiently ambiguous to
warrant an examination of the debates in Congress. Cf. United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U. S. 649 at 699, 18 S. Ct. 456 (1898): "doubtless, the intention of the
Congress which framed and of the States which adopted this Amendment of the
Constitution must be sought in the words of the Amendment; and the debates in
Congress are not admissible as evidence to control the meaning of the words,"
19
The expansion of due process was foreshadowed in Dred Scott v. Sanford,
,19 ;How. (60 U.S.) 393 at 450 (1856) (on due process under the Fifth Amendment);
Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 655 (1875); fulfilled in Chicago,
_Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, IO S. Ct. 462, 702 (1889);
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 17 S. Ct. 427 (1897); Smyth v. Ames, 169
U.S. 466, 18 S. Ct. 418 (1898); and reached its extreme in Lochner v. New York,
198 U. S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905); Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 28 S.
Ct. 277 (1908). See HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAw CoNCEPTS 143-165
(1930); Edgerton, "The Incidence of Judicial Control over Congress," 22 CoRN.
L. Q. 299 (1937); Howard, "The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship
and Colgate o. Haroey," 87 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 262 at 268, notes 15 and 16 (1939).
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the law, and the clause became virtually a dead letter. It has long been
settled that this clause does not cover the privileges and immunities
comprised in the Bill of Rights of the first eight amendments. 20 Of
the fifty-odd cases in which counsel have since invoked this clause
against state action,21 only two have seen the contention accepted by
the Supreme Court. One was Colgate v. Harvey,22 in which a Vermont
statute imposing a discriminatory tax on loans made to persons outside
Vermont was held unconstitutionally to abridge the privilege of a
United States citizen of doing business throughout the nation. This
was deemed a part of the privilege of free passage from state to state,
"inherent" in federal citizenship.28
The second case is Hague v. C.I.0.,24 decided at the Court's last
term. In the lower courts, freedom of speech and assembly were upheld
on the basis of the due process clause,25 and this view was taken in
concurring opinions in the Supreme Court by Justices Stone ( with
whom Justice Reed joined) and Hughes. The opinion first reported,
however, written by Justice Roberts (with whom Justice Black concurred), grounds the decision on the privileges and immunities clause.28
20 See cases cited in Howard, ''The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate fl. Haroey," 87 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 262 at 270 (1939).
21 These cases are cited in Justice Stone's dissent to Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U. S. 404 at 445, note 2, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935); and in his dissent to the instant
case, (U. S. 1939) 59 S. Ct. 954 at 967, note 1. To these sh.ould be added Ferry v.
Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 258 U.S. 314, 42 S. Ct. 358 (1922). Howard, "The Privileges
and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate fl. H(1fTJey," 87 UNIV. PA. L. REV.
262 at 272, note 50 (1939).
22
296 U.S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252 (1935).
28
See Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 at 79 (1873); Crandall
v. Nevada, 6 Wall. (73 U. S.) 35 (1868) (before the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
24 Hague v. C.I.O., (U. S. 1939) 59 S. Ct. 954. See discussions cited in note 4,
supra.
25
This view is in accord with a line of cases holding that civil liberties are protected as part of the "liberty" guaranteed against deprivation without due process.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625 (1925); Whitney v. California,
274 U. S. 357, 47 S. Ct. 641 (1927); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380, 47 S. Ct.
·655 (1927); Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532 (1931); Near
v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S. Ct. 444 (1936); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S.
353, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 57 S. Ct. 732
(1937); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S. Ct. 666 (1938).
26
The opinion relies on a dictum in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542
at 552 (1875), which stated that freedom of assembly is not as such protected from
state invasion by the Privileges and Immunities clause, but "The right of the people
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances,
or for any thing else connected with the powers or the duties of the national govet'1lllnent
[italics supplied], is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government,
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The opinion states that the plaintiffs (respondents) were holding public
meetings to discuss the National Labor Relations Act, and that peace·able assembly to discuss a federal act is a privilege or immunity of a
citizen of the United States, secured against abridgement by the Fourteenth Amendment. While this view would not place freedom of speech
and of assembly generally under the protection of the privileges and
immunities clause, it is perhaps an opening wedge in that direction.
As Justice Stone pointed out, it was not necessary to place the decision
on the privileges and immunities clause, since there is good precedent
for protection of freedom of speech and of assembly under the due
process clause. Justice Hughes conceded that discussion of the NLRA
would come under the protection of the privileges and immunities
clause, but did not agree that jurisdiction on that ground was supported
by the record, since the primary purpose of plaintiffs was the organization of labor unions. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented briefly,
while Justices Frankfurter and Douglas did not take part in the
decision.
Justice Stone pointed out the better protection afforded by the due
process clause, which applies to all persons (including aliens), while
the privileges and immunities clause protects only citizens ( not aliens
or corporations).27 He agreed that one of the plaintiffs, a corporation,
should not be protected by the decree, since the liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause does not extend to the "personal liberty" of corporations, as contrasted with the guarantee of property found in that
clause.28 Aside from the greater efficacy of the due process clause,
Justice Stone's objection to the use of the privileges and immunities
clause was the same as that set forth in the Slaughterhouse Cases, that
the opposite construction would extend national judicial and congressional power over the states to an unknown degree. 29 In view of the
precisely similar extension of judicial power which has taken place
under the due process clause, and in view of the decision in the Civil
Rights Cases,3° that the congressional power granted in section five of
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances."
This ground was first raised on argument to the Supreme Court, says Justice Stone.
Principal case, 59 S. Ct. 954 at 967.
27 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 168 (1869); Selover, Bates & Co. v.
Walsh, 226 U.S. II2, 33 S. Ct. 69 (1912).
28 Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U. S. 243 at 255, 27 S. Ct.
126 (1906); Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 399, 27 S. Ct. 384 (1907).
29 Principal case, 59 S. Ct. 954 at 966, note 1. See Slaughterhouse Cases, 16
Wall. (83 U. S.) 36 at 78 (1873), where it was said that the opposite construction
"radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments to each other and of both these goYernments to the people. • .."
so 109 U. S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18 (1876).
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the Fourteenth Amendment is confined to correction of state action,
and does not permit general legislation on the subject, this reasoning
cannot now be deemed weighty. However, the great number of precedents on the interpretation of this clause are not lightly to be overturned, especially when the same purposes can be achieved under the
due process clause.
Since Justices Black and Roberts must have had some reason, other
than intellectual ingenuity, for thus unnecessarily invoking the privileges and immunities clause, the conjecture suggests itself that they
may be inclined to narrow the scope of the due process clause,81 perhaps eventually limiting it to procedural guarantees,32 while broadening the privileges and immunities clause to protect civil liberties. This
would withdraw constitutional protection in the substantive sense from
corporations and aliens in all situations, leaving citizens protected in
their individual rights. 33 Obviously, such a doctrinal development is
highly speculative. It is always easy to read too much into a new decision on constitutional law. If there is any likelihood of such a course,
its wisdom is open to serious doubt. Apart from the debatable problem
of protecting corporations and aliens, the protection to civil liberties
which has slowly been won in the last fifteen years under the due process
clause would have to be completely relitigated under the privileges
and immunities clause. It would be better, it is submitted, should the
Court continue its present policy of self-restraint in determining whether
laws are "arbitrary" under the due process clause, while leaving the
well-established power of review under that clause intact.
John N. Seaman

81 Justice Black believes that a corporation is not to be deemed a person within
the protection of the due process clause. Dissent to Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co.
v. Johnson, 303 U. S. 77, 58 S. Ct. 436 (1938).
82 This was the early doctrine. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How.
(59 U. S.) 272 (1855).
83 Cf. Borchard, "The Supreme Court and Private Rights," 47 YALE L. J. 1051
at 1077 (1938): "A more natural interpretation of the 'privileges and immunities'
clause would have avoided the temptation to inflate the due process clause, and even
now points the way out."

